OFI Asset Management v. Cooper Tire — civil — affirmance — Jordan
In a 51-page opinion, the Third Circuit today rejected an appellant’s challenge to the district court’s management of a complex securities-fraud class action. The court criticized the clarity appellant’s underlying complaint, then wryly observed:
Now that OFI [the plaintiff-appellant] has come to us with the same kind of broad averments that drove the District Court to demand specificity, we find ourselves more than sympathetic to that Court’s position.
The court also rejected a long list of intensely factbound substantive arguments.
Joining Jordan were Ambro and Scirica. Arguing counsel were James Harrod of Bernstein Litowitz for the appellants and Geoffrey Ritts of Jones Day for the appellees.
Goldman v. Citigroup Global — civil — affirmance — Jordan
The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a securities suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments under Grable & Sons v. Darue Engineering that the court had jurisdiction despite the absence of a federal cause of action. The court refused to be bound by language in a prior precedential opinion such “a summary and unexplained jurisdictional ruling” where jurisdiction was not in dispute has no precedential effect. The court also rejected the appellants’ argument that an arbitration panel’s manifest disregard for the law created a federal-question jurisdictional hook.
Joining Jordan were McKee and Roth. Arguing counsel were Richard Gerace for the appellants and Brian Feeney of Greenberg Traurig for the appellees.
Dempsey v. Bucknell University — civil rights — affirmance — Krause
College student Reed Dempsey was arrested after another student accused him of assaulting her. The affidavit of probable cause accompanying the criminal complaint “recklessly omitted” certain facts. After the charges were later dropped, Dempsey brought a civil rights suit alleging that the arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Today, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Dempsey because, even considering the omitted facts, a reasonable jury could not find lack of probable cause to arrest. The court rejected Dempsey’s argument that, in analyzing a probable cause issue at summary judgment, a court must ignore unfavorable disputed facts. It held that, “when a court determines that information was asserted or omitted in an affidavit of probable cause with at least reckless disregard for the truth, it must perform a word-by-word reconstruction of the affidavit.” It ruled that information was recklessly omitted, reconstructed the affidavit to include it, and held that the any reasonable juror would find that the reconstructed affidavit established probable cause.
Joining Krause were Vanaskie and Shwartz. Arguing counsel were Dennis Boyle (formerly) of Fox Rothschild for Dempsey and James Keller of Saul Ewing for the defendants.
Brown v. Superintendent SCI Greene — habeas corpus — reversal — Ambro
The introduction of today’s opinion granting habeas corpus relief:
This case has a familiar cast of characters: two co-defendants, a confession, and a jury. And, for the most part, it follows a conventional storyline. In the opening chapter, one of the defendants (Miguel Garcia) in a murder case gives a confession to the police that, in addition to being self-incriminating, says that the other defendant (Antonio Lambert1) pulled the trigger. When Lambert and Garcia are jointly tried in Pennsylvania state court, the latter declines to testify, thereby depriving the former of the ability to cross-examine him about the confession. The judge therefore redacts the confession in an effort to comply with Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). As a result, when the jury hears Garcia’s confession, Lambert’s name is replaced with terms like “the other guy.” The idea is that the inability to cross-examine Garcia is harmless if the jury has no reason to think that the confession implicates Lambert.
During closing arguments, however, there is a twist when the prosecutor unmasks Lambert and reveals to the jurors that he has been, all along, “the other guy.” Now, instead of a conclusion, we have a sequel. Based on a Sixth Amendment violation caused by the closing arguments, we conclude that Lambert is entitled to relief. We therefore remand so that the District Court can give Pennsylvania (the “Commonwealth”) the option either to retry or release him.
In holding that the Bruton error was not harmless, the court noted that the prosecution’s key witness had flaws and rejected the state’s argument that error was harmless because the jury already knew about these other flaws and believed the witness anyway.
Joining Ambro were Krause and Nygaard. Arguing counsel were Ariana Freeman of the EDPA Federal Community Defender for Brown and Susan Affronti of the Philadelphia DA for the state.